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Abstract
I defend the idea that objects and events in three-dimensional space (so-called
local beables) are part of the derivative ontology of quantum mechanics, rather
than its fundamental ontology. The main objection to this idea stems from the
question of how it can endow local beables with physical salience, as opposed to
mere mathematical definability. I show that the responses to this objection in
the previous literature are insufficient, and I provide the necessary arguments
to render them successful. This includes demonstrating the legitimacy of dy-
namical considerations in the derivation of local beables and responding to the
threat stemming from the availability of different sets of local beables in the
context of the GRW theory.
Keywords: Local beables, Primitive ontology, Quantum mechanics, Wave
function realism
1. Introduction
A central issue in the debate on the ontology of quantum mechanics concerns
the status of objects and events situated in three-dimensional space, the so-
called local beables. According to one camp in the debate, to which I will refer
as primitivist, local beables need to be postulated at the fundamental ontological
level, thus specifying what has come to be known as the primitive ontology of the
theory (see Allori 2015 for an up-to-date review of this approach). Its opponents,
whom I will call reductionists2, deny the need for such postulates, because they
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2I introduce this label because all the other labels that have been attached to this camp
in the previous debate strike me as somewhat inaccurate. For example, the position is often
dubbed “wave function realism”, but this obscures the fact that also the primitivist approach
is compatible with some varieties of realism about the wave function (or more precisely, about
the quantum state represented by the wave function; see Belot 2012; Egg and Esfeld 2015).
The term “wave function monism” would be more accurate, but it would exclude Albert’s
(1996; 2015) version of Bohmian mechanics, which is explicitly opposed to primitivism. The
recently proposed term “3N-fundamentalist” (Chen forthcoming) is almost perfect, but it
fails to capture Wallace’s (2012) spacetime state realism, which is another important foil for
primitivism.
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hold that insofar as we need local beables to account for our experience of a
three-dimensional world, they are reducible to a fundamental ontology that does
not include them. This fundamental ontology is given by the quantum state of
the world and its temporal evolution, and the reductionists claim that certain
features of this evolution manifest themselves as three-dimensional structures.
Some reductionist approaches appeal to functional roles of (parts of) the
quantum state (Albert, 2015, chaps. 6 and 7), some to real patterns in its
evolution (Wallace, 2012, chap. 2), some to symmetries (Ney forthcoming), but
these differences do not matter here. My purpose in this paper is rather to
defend the general idea of non-fundamental local beables against some criticism
from primitivists, in particular the critique by Maudlin (2007). I do not advocate
any particular account of how to reduce local beables to the quantum state, but
I aim to show that some of the principled worries voiced by primitivists against
these accounts are unfounded.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I will clarify the different
positions in the debate and spell out what I take to be the main challenge for
reductionism about local beables, namely the need to account for the physical
salience of (non-fundamental) local beables. Sections 3 and 4 then discuss two
responses to this challenge, the first one based on dynamical considerations,
the second one on the empirical significance of local beables. In each of these
two sections, I will first show why earlier responses along the same lines were
incomplete, and then provide the necessary arguments to render them convinc-
ing. This will lead to the conclusion (in section 5) that the reductionist can
successfully deal with the challenge issued by the primitivist.
2. Preliminary distinctions
2.1. Informational vs. ontological completeness
In order to analyze the ontological status of local beables in relation to the
quantum mechanical wave function, Maudlin (2007) introduces the crucial dis-
tinction between informational and ontological completeness. A description is
informationally complete “if every physical fact about the situation can be re-
covered from the description” (3151). By contrast, “an ontologically complete
description of a physical situation should provide—in a relatively transparent
way—an exact representation of all of the physical entities and states that ex-
ist. . . . [It] should say just what there is and no more” (3154). As an initial
illustration of this contrast, Maudlin mentions the scalar and vector potentials
of classical electrodynamics, which furnish informationally complete descrip-
tions, but are usually not taken to directly describe the physical ontology of the
classical electromagnetic theory (3152).
To further clarify the relevant distinction, Maudlin shows that it can also be
framed in terms familiar from other philosophical debates, namely nomic su-
pervenience and ontological reduction3 (3152-53): Let A be an informationally
3Neither Maudlin nor the other participants in the debate are very explicit about the
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complete part of a description B of a certain situation. Then B nomically su-
pervenes on A in the sense that there cannot be a difference in what is described
by B without a difference in what is described by A. This is to be distinguished
from the claim that the referents of B are ontologically reducible to the referents
of A, which is to say that A is ontologically complete.
The relation between informational and ontological completeness (or, equiv-
alently, between nomic supervenience and ontological reduction) is a complex
one, as Maudlin (2007, 3153) illustrates by giving some examples of informa-
tionally complete descriptions which differ radically with regard to ontological
completeness. On one end of the spectrum are cases where informational and
ontological completeness clearly go hand in hand, as when the tables in a room
are described in terms of the distribution of atoms in the room: not only are all
the facts about tables recoverable from a complete description of the atoms, but
the tables “are nothing over and above the atoms” (ibid.). On the other end of
the spectrum is the case of a deterministic universe, where the entire history of
the world supervenes on the global physical state of the world at one particular
moment (given the dynamical laws), but no one would claim that this history
is nothing over and above the state at that one moment. In other words, the
description of the state of the world at one particular instant is informationally
but not ontologically complete. Between these two extremes, there are con-
troversial cases such as the description of the electromagnetic field in classical
electrodynamics: it is informationally complete in the sense that all the facts
about the charge distribution can be recovered from a full description of the
electromagnetic field (given Maxwell’s equations), and this might suggest, but
does not imply ontological completeness. As Maudlin puts it: “The attempt to
somehow reduce charges or charged particles to nothing but states of the field
does not seem crazy, but neither does it seem inevitable” (ibid.).
Applying this distinction to versions of quantum mechanics without addi-
tional variables, we may (neglecting some subtleties mentioned in Maudlin 2007,
footnote 3) assume that the description given by the wave function is informa-
tionally complete. The central question then is whether it is ontologically com-
plete as well. Maudlin’s negative answer to that question is based on two claims:
(1) a reasonable ontology for a physical theory must contain local beables, and
(2) it is not clear how local beables could be ontologically reduced to (or derived
from) the quantum state.
2.2. Eliminative vs. conservative reductionism
The three basic options regarding the ontological status of local beables are
summarized in the following table:
notion of reduction they presuppose (Ney (2013) being an exception). The common practice
of using “reduction” and “derivation” interchangeably (which I will also adopt in what follows)
indicates that some broadly Nagelian picture constitutes the background for the debate.
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Local beables exist: They are fundamental:
Eliminative reductionism no no
Conservative reductionism yes no
Primitivism yes yes
The distinction between eliminative and conservative reductionism is not
always properly drawn, because there is some ambiguity in the notion of “on-
tology”. On a restrictive reading, the ontology of a theory only includes what
is fundamental. On a more liberal reading, it includes whatever is real, be it
fundamental or derivative. At some points Maudlin clearly adopts the second
reading, otherwise the very notion of “derivative ontology” (discussed on p. 3161
of his paper) would be oxymoronic. But then sometimes he also sympathizes
with the restrictive reading, according to which, unless one introduces local be-
ables as elements of fundamental ontology, they “do not really exist” (3163) and
“all of this talk of local beables in ordinary space is just a fiction” (3165).
One might think that this is just a verbal issue: The primitivist’s core claim
is that local beables are ontologically fundamental, and both brands of reduc-
tionism deny this. Does it then really matter that one of them still calls the
local beables “real” (or “existing”), while the other one views them as fictions?
I think it does, but I also think that there is a legitimate way of treating elimi-
native and conservative reductionism together in the present context. So let me
first explain why we must acknowledge the difference between these two reduc-
tionist positions, before I argue (in the next subsection) that the difference can
be neglected for the rest of this paper.
Notice first that the debate about the ontological status of local beables is
a debate between scientific realists, who generally believe that the entities we
posit in our successful scientific explanations really do exist (although they dis-
agree sharply about which entities are actually posited by quantum mechanical
explanations). Now since most of our scientific explanations seem to involve
local beables, eliminativism about them has not been a very popular position
in the debate.4 I am not here concerned with the question whether this lack
of popularity is justified or not, but I want to highlight a consequence of this
situation for the debate between primitivists and reductionists: under such cir-
cumstances, primitivism can be made to look much more convincing if it is
presented as an alternative to eliminative reductionism than if the foil is conser-
vative reductionism. But this would be an illegitimate move, because it would
allow the primitivist to attack reductionism by means of arguments that only
work against its eliminative variant.
Unfortunately, this is precisely what happens in the following passage, where
Maudlin (2007, 3166) mistakes an argument in favor of the reality of local be-
4I know of only two instances in the literature where eliminativism about local beables is
advocated, namely Albert (1996) and Ney (2015, section 7). But even these authors, in other
parts of their work, at least implicitly acknowledge the relative attractiveness of conserving
local beables instead of eliminating them (see, in particular, Ney forthcoming, p. 1 and fn.
10).
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ables for an argument in favor of their fundamentality :
But it is clear what would solve the problem [of accounting for ob-
servations that seem to be of particularly situated objects in a three-
dimensional space]: remove all the talk of fiction! If one believes that
in addition to the wavefunction there really is an ordinary space that
really does contain local beables that really do evolve in a specified
way determined by the wavefunction, then you have something.
The (conservative) reductionist can agree with everything in this passage
except the phrase “in addition to the wavefunction”. That phrase, she will
(correctly, to my mind) insist, expresses an ontological commitment which is in
no way warranted by the explanatory success arising from a commitment to the
reality of local beables. The clearest way to see this is to consider a parallel
case based on one of the examples mentioned above: I have a visual experience
of a table standing in the corner of my room, and I explain this by saying that
there really is a table in the corner of my room. Does that somehow commit
me to the belief that the table is an ontologically irreducible object? Of course
not. The explanation succeeds as long as the table is real, regardless of whether
it is something over and above a collection of atoms.
2.3. The core challenge to reductionism
At the end of subsection 2.1, I mentioned two claims on which primitivism
about local beables relies. By asserting the reality of local beables, agreement to
claim (1) unites primitivism with conservative reductionism (against eliminative
reductionism). By contrast, claim (2) marks the distinction between primitivism
and reductionism (of either variant) by questioning the reduction of local beables
to the quantum state. I will now explain why I take the disagreement about (2)
to be much more substantial, which is why the rest of this paper will focus on the
debate between primitivism and reductionism, disregarding the disagreement
within reductionism.
First, while eliminativism’s above-mentioned lack of popularity depends on
a particular conception of scientific realism, I have argued elsewhere that this
is indeed a reasonable stance to take in the scientific realism debate (Egg 2014,
14-16; see also Psillos 2005). Accordingly, there are good philosophical reasons
for the sociological fact that eliminativism has few advocates and that conser-
vative reductionism first and foremost must be defended against primitivism,
not against eliminative reductionism.
Furthermore, one motivation for entertaining eliminative reductionism comes
from the conviction that conservative reductionism about local beables is not
viable. By responding to what I take to be the most carefully worked out attack
on this latter kind of reductionism, the following sections seek to go at least some
way towards removing that motivation.5
5 Other (somewhat less well-developed) arguments against conservative reductionism can
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Finally, although the argument to be discussed here is primarily directed
against conservative reductionism, it can easily be transformed into an argument
against eliminative reductionism and should therefore properly be regarded as
an argument against reductionism tout court. Here is how the argument seeks
to support claim (2):
The notion is that the dynamics of a very high-dimensional object in
a high-dimensional space could somehow implicitly contain within
it—as a purely analytical consequence—a description of local beables
in a common low-dimensional space. This approach turns critically
on what such a derivation of something isomorphic to local structure
would look like, where the derived structure deserves to be regarded
as physically salient (rather than merely mathematically definable).
Until we know how to identify physically serious derivative structure,
it is not clear how to implement this strategy. (Maudlin, 2007, 3161)
The worry expressed in this quote is that there is no obvious connection be-
tween the configuration space in which the quantum state evolves and the
three-dimensional space of local beables. While it is possible to mathematically
define such a correspondence, one would have to show that this particular cor-
respondence is “physically salient”, distinguishing it from the plethora of other
mathematically definable correspondences between the wave function and low-
dimensional structures (most of them very bizarre and utterly different from
what we experience). The fact that this particular correspondence strikes us as
natural and simple may be seen as just an epistemic observation without any
ontological import (Monton, 2002, 269).
This is certainly a problem for the conservative reductionist, who claims that
the quantum state by itself somehow gives rise to local beables. Why then does
it not also give rise to all these other bizarre entities? Or if it does, why do
we not experience them? Let us dwell on this second question for a moment,
as it allows us to see how the worry also affects eliminative reductionism. The
eliminativist, of course, is under no obligation to look for a feature that marks
out local beables as real among this host of merely mathematically “derivable”
structures. But he nonetheless needs to account for the fact that our experiences
are as if there were local beables. And if the quantum state is ontologically
sufficient to ground these experiences (as it must be, since there is nothing else,
according to the eliminativist), the very same question as above arises: why
does the quantum state not also give rise to all these other bizarrely structured
experiences? Hence, the challenge issued by the primitivist faces both types
of reductionism with equal strength. Whether one seeks to reduce real local
beables or only the appearance thereof to the quantum state, in either case one
needs to demonstrate the salience of the derived structure.
be found in Lewis (2013), Monton (2013) and Ney (2015). I plan to address these in another
paper.
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3. Shapes vs. dynamics as the vehicle for reduction
Reductionists like Albert and Wallace address the foregoing objection by
appealing to the dynamical behavior of the quantum state. They admit that
mathematically, the quantum state could correspond to many different low-
dimensional structures, but they point out that the dynamics of the quantum
state singles out the three-dimensional structure of local beables. This is re-
flected in the fact that the Hamiltonian operator describing the evolution of
a quantum state formally corresponds to a classical Hamiltonian describing a
system of particles in three-dimensional space (Albert, 1996).
Primitivists are, however, not convinced by this response. They may ac-
knowledge that the appeal to dynamics could, in principle, be used to reduce
local beables to the quantum state, but they maintain that this kind of reduc-
tion falls short of the transparency and simplicity we find in other reduction
relations, for example in the reduction of macroscopic bodies to collections of
particles. Maudlin (2014, 798) explicitly emphasizes this contrast in his discus-
sion of Wallace’s (2012) proposal to identify physical objects (such as cats) as
dynamical patterns in the development of the quantum state:
Whether any of these individual [quantum] states contains a “cat-
shaped object” cannot be determined from examination of the state
alone. (Contrast this with a theory that postulates particles in space:
the disposition of particles at a given time can unproblematically
be described as “cat-shaped” without reference to any dynamics.)
Rather, to determine the physical content of any one state, one has to
refer back to all the other states, and how they are connected by law.
Reflection on all of the dynamical connections is somehow supposed
to reveal whether a certain situation contains a cat chasing a mouse,
even though the individual states, in themselves, have nothing cat-
shaped or mouse-shaped in them. How this bootstrapping could
exactly occur I can’t quite tell.
The reductionist could, of course, simply insist that reductions referring to
dynamics, though more complicated, are still legitimate, because this complica-
tion is more than compensated by the avoidance of postulating local beables as
additional primitives. The debate would thereby threaten to degenerate into a
mere exchange of expressions of ontological taste. What I want to show now,
however, is that the reductionist can do better, by arguing that even the in-
stances of reduction favored by the primitivist ultimately cannot do without
dynamical considerations.
In fact, a first set of dynamical considerations is already needed before the
discussion just mentioned can even start. In the above quotation, Maudlin takes
for granted the physical salience of macroscopic bodies like cats (as opposed to
arbitrary other collections of particles). What accounts for this salience is not
the mere shape of these collections, but their dynamical stability. There is, after
all, nothing physically salient about a cat-shaped collection of air molecules.
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But there is also a more subtle way in which dynamical considerations are
likely to be necessary even for the (supposedly) unproblematic cases of reduc-
tion Maudlin cites. The success of identifying macroscopic objects as particu-
larly shaped collections of particles without reference to any dynamics depends
critically on the physical theory describing the particles. It is well known that
contemporary physics does not straightforwardly support the idea of particles
as fundamental building blocks of material bodies (see, e.g., Ladyman and Ross
2007; Healey 2013), so what is needed to hold on to that metaphysical picture is
some non-standard quantum theory of matter, along the lines of Bohmian me-
chanics. What makes Bohmian mechanics an appealing candidate for spelling
out the physical details of how atoms form a table is that it can account for
all the surprising quantum effects in the behavior of particles (entanglement,
non-locality, spin etc.), but treats them as purely dynamical effects, while the
underlying ontology is a classically atomistic one of particles in ordinary space.
However, everybody agrees that Bohmian mechanics (just like standard
quantummechanics) is an incomplete theory, not only because it is non-relativistic,
but (more importantly for our purpose) because it treats interactions (insofar as
it treats them at all) in a semi-classical way, so it is certainly not the final word
on how particles form macroscopic bodies. There are various directions of re-
search towards more complete Bohmian theories of matter seeking to recover the
empirical predictions of ordinary quantum field theory (QFT) (see Struyve 2011
for a review). Some of them abandon the particle ontology of Bohmian mechan-
ics and turn to a field ontology, thereby undermining the idea that macroscopic
bodies are made of elementary particles. But even the approaches that retain
a particle ontology render the task of identifying macroscopic objects without
reference to any dynamics more difficult than the above quotation by Maudlin
suggests.
There are essentially two particle-based approaches to QFT, and both of
them seem to populate space with many more particles than the electrons and
quarks of which we think as matter constituents. First, there is the Dirac
sea pilot-wave model (Colin and Struyve 2007; Deckert et al. forthcoming),
which postulates a large (but finite, due to a high-momentum cut-off) number
of fermions occupying negative energy states. Second, according to the Bohmian
QFT proposed by Dürr et al. (2004), particle creations and annihilations are
viewed as actual processes in space and time. Within such a theory, vacuum
fluctuations correspond to real particle-anti-particle pairs appearing and disap-
pearing in space and time.
I do not know of any precise calculation of the density of these additional
particles, but Struyve (2011, 8) estimates that it is of the same order for both
types of theories, namely of order Λ3, where Λ is the inverse Planck length. If
anything like this is true, then the quarks and electrons which constitute macro-
scopic bodies make up only an extremely small fraction of the complete particle
content of any given region of space. And since there is no intrinsic difference
between the fermions that constitute matter and the background fermions (ei-
ther belonging to the Dirac sea or to the vacuum fluctuations), there seems to
be no way of discerning a cat-shaped arrangement in this abundance of particles
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unless one takes into account the behavior of the particles in time.6
These are admittedly speculative considerations, so one might think that
they do not constitute a definitive argument for the inevitability of dynamical
considerations in reductions. I agree that future theoretical developments may
yet again create space for a non-dynamical reduction of macroscopic bodies
to collections of particles, but the situation sketched here makes this a rather
unlikely scenario. It is not just that, despite their best efforts, researchers in
Bohmian QFT have not yet come up with a theory that would support the
idea of such a reduction, but that even the research programs which offer the
most hope for generating such a theory have turned out to render this idea
problematic. Therefore, it is fair to say that neither current physics nor any
reasonable expectations about future physics do support Maudlin’s misgivings
about using dynamics in ontological reductions.
4. Underdetermination of (physically salient) derivative ontologies
There is in the literature a surprisingly simple second response to the prim-
itivist’s question of what distinguishes local beables from all the other math-
ematically definable structures which have nothing to do with our experience:
local beables are physically salient precisely because they do explain our experi-
ences and therefore strike us as natural, in contrast to all the bizarre, contrived
and explanatorily irrelevant structures one could define in addition to them.
Huggett and Wüthrich (2013, 283) emphasize this point (in direct response to
Maudlin (2007)):
There are two ways of looking at the idea of physical salience: ‘from
below’, as Maudlin seems to, taking for granted that the theory has
physical salience, and asking what formal derivations of higher-level
structures preserve it. But one can equally legitimately consider the
idea ‘from above’, taking for granted that the empirical realm has
physical salience (which it certainly does), and asking how it can
‘flow down’ formal derivations to give physical significance to the
underlying theory.
Assessing physical salience in that manner obviously provides a way of distin-
guishing local beables from all kinds of bizarre structures that could in principle
6Colin and Struyve (2007) argue that on a coarse-grained level, their model allows for a
distinction between macroscopic states of sufficiently distinct fermion density (they give the
example of a spherical region filled with either graphite or air, and they calculate that the
distinction succeeds if the radius b of the region satisfies b  2.6 × 10−6 m). But surely
any satisfactory account of macroscopic bodies should also work for objects surrounded by
matter of similar density, for example fish in water. Colin’s and Struyve’s account is not fine-
grained enough for this, because it is unable to discern fermion arrangements corresponding
to different types of atoms, which would be necessary to (non-dynamically) distinguish a fish
from the water surrounding it.
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just as well be “derived” from the wave function. However, a look at the main ex-
ample used by Maudlin (2007, 3161) to illustrate the worry of surplus derivative
structure shows that this response is, by itself, insufficient:
Until we know how to identify physically serious derivative struc-
ture, it is not clear how to implement this strategy [of deriving local
beables from the wave function]. As we will shortly see, for example,
the same GRW dynamics can be supplemented by different local be-
ables: a mass density ontology and a flash ontology. Presumably,
an account that treats these local beables as derived would deter-
mine whether one or the other (or neither) of these is the derivative
ontology that is ‘really’ implicit in the GRW dynamics.
The case of GRW is a well-known example of a theory that comes in onto-
logically different versions sharing the same mathematical formalism (see Allori
et al. 2008). The crucial point is that the two versions cited by Maudlin (usually
called GRWm and GRWf, respectively) also share their empirical predictions,
which immediately implies that the strategy of choosing between them “from
above” will not work. This is a familiar problem of underdetermination, but it
is here combined with a less familiar one: not only is the choice between GRWm
and GRWf underdetermined by the empirical evidence, but it is also underde-
termined by the underlying fundamental theory (GRW without local beables,
called GRW0).
There are two principled ways to deal with problems of underdetermination:
one can either try to look for a sense in which the seemingly contradicting
theories are compatible after all, or one can accept their incompatibility and
argue that one of the theoretical options (although we may never know which
one) is in fact the right one. Since I do not want my defense of reductionism
to depend on any one of these two methodologies, I will give two responses to
the problem of underdetermination in GRW, each one attuned to one of the
two methodologies. Taken together, they will show that, regardless of the more
general stance one takes with respect to underdetermination, the GRW case
does not present a problem for reductionism about local beables.
4.1. Dissolving underdetermination by seeking compatibility
The idea that different derivative ontologies can be compatible with each
other has previously been defended by Ney (2015, 3115), but it is unclear
whether her argument can be applied to the case of the different GRW on-
tologies. To illustrate her proposal, Ney gives the example of a fundamental
ontology in a nine-dimensional space, giving rise to two different derivative
ontologies in a three-dimensional and a six-dimensional subspace, respectively.
Unfortunately, this example is significantly dissimilar to the GRW case, not only
because our three-dimensional space is not a subspace of the configuration space
in which the quantum state evolves,7 but also because, as we will see, there is
7Ney (2015, fn. 18) herself draws attention to this fact.
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some strong prima facie evidence that the ontologies of GRWm and GRWf are
actually not compatible with each other. I shall now attempt to overcome these
problems.
The first obstacle to the compatibility of GRWm and GRWf is that the space-
time pictures of physical reality painted by these two theories differ radically,
as Maudlin (2007, 3167) points out:
If all one could see were space time and the local beables (but if one
could see them in all details), the fine-grained pictures provided by
the theories would have nothing in common. In Ghirardi’s [GRWm]
world, one sees an evolving continuous mass density that would usu-
ally change continuously but would sometime undergo discontinuous
changes that result in the sudden clumping of the mass in small re-
gions of space. In Bell’s [GRWf] world, one would see almost nothing
at all: just a relatively sparse distribution of flashes, one for each of
the sudden jumps in the alternative theory.
How can I claim that these two ontologies are compatible with each other,
when for almost all space-time points, one of them affirms and the other one
denies that there is something at that point? As a first step towards an answer,
notice that Maudlin’s assertion about the space-time pictures of the two theories
having “nothing in common” is plainly false, because the most striking features
of the GRWm world—namely, the spontaneous clumpings of matter in small re-
gions of space—occur precisely where the flashes are in the GRWf picture. The
two ontologies therefore agree exactly about the set F of all space-time points
at which a local maximum of matter density occurs. This commonality allows
us to apply a strategy familiar from other debates on underdetermination, sug-
gesting that we should be committed to only those features which the different
ontological options have in common (French, 2011). In the present case, this
is to assert that there definitely is matter at the points in F , leaving it open
whether the rest of space-time M \ F is empty (as GRWf claims) or not (as
in GRWm). This latter question, after all, does not make a difference for the
empirical content of the theory.
Not everybody will be satisfied with such a partial commitment, however.
Some will insist that a serious ontological position must not simply duck the
question of what there is outside of F . Before addressing that objection, let me
briefly discuss two more worries raised by Maudlin (2007, 3167-8) against the
view that GRWm and GRWf are compatible with each other.
First, he observes that “the research programmes that naturally arise from
the alternative pictures are in some ways diametrically opposed”: whereas GRWm
suggests looking for a continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) dynamics in-
stead of the discontinuous GRW collapses, this “is the last thing that one would
pursue” in GRWf, because eliminating the GRW jumps would eliminate the
local ontology altogether.
It seems to me that this view begs the question against the reductionist
by treating GRWm and GRWf as fundamental theories (relative to the current
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state of research), because otherwise they would not be regarded as helpful
guides towards a more fundamental theory. But from the reductionist point of
view, GRW0 is the fundamental theory which should guide further research, and
as it turns out, the considerations motivating the CSL model (e.g., Bassi and
Ghirardi 2003, 312) are indeed just as much part of GRW0 as of GRWm. Also
the publication history suggests that it was not GRWm that motivated Ghirardi
and his collaborators to develop CSL, but that they developed CSL on the basis
of GRW0 (Ghirardi et al., 1990) and only later proposed the matter density
ontology as a supplement for both the GRW and the CSL model (Ghirardi
et al., 1995).
The second feature Maudlin adduces to emphasize the contrast between
GRWm and GRWf is that the latter has a far better chance of being made
compatible with special relativity than the former. As with the previous objec-
tion, the force of this argument is diminished by the fact that, in a framework
within which space-time is regarded as derivative, issues of Lorentz invariance
can hardly claim fundamental importance. Nevertheless, the question how lo-
cal beables (even derivative ones) behave under Lorentz transformations is of
some relevance. At the time Maudlin’s paper appeared (2007), it looked indeed
as if there was a decisive advantage for GRWf as regards Lorentz invariance:
Tumulka (2006) had just published his relativistic version of GRWf, while the
available definitions of the matter density in GRWm depended on integration
over a spacelike hypersurface, which seemed to rule out Lorentz invariant GRWm
models from the start. In the meantime, this situation has significantly changed.
We now not only have a relativistic GRWm model (Bedingham et al., 2014), but
also an argument indicating that Tumulka’s GRWf model is Lorentz-invariant
only in a somewhat restricted sense (Esfeld and Gisin, 2014, section 3). Lorentz
invariance should therefore no longer be regarded as a crucial difference between
GRWm and GRWf.
4.2. Breaking the underdetermination
The above attempt to establish compatibility between GRWm and GRWf
will not have convinced those who think that there ought to be a fact of the
matter as to whether there is something or nothing at the points in M \F . The
two ontologies definitely disagree about this issue, so at most8 one of them can
be right. Therefore, under the assumption that the matter content of M \ F is
a substantial issue, the underdetermination between GRWm and GRWf cannot
be dissolved, but must be broken by opting for one of the two ontologies.9
8In the following, I will disregard the possibility that both ontologies are false. In the
absence of an empirically adequate proposal for yet another GRW ontology (and keeping in
mind the remarks about eliminativism in section 2), GRWm and GRWf can be treated as
exhausting the space of possibilities.
9There is also an intermediate position, which acknowledges the incompatibility of the
two ontologies but still refrains from choosing one of them, remaining agnostic instead. This
position does not need to be treated separately, because it differs from the one advocating a
choice between the two options only on the epistemic level. On the ontic level, both these
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At first sight, this situation does not seem to create a specific problem for
reductionism about local beables. After all, the need to select one of the two
ontologies arises for the primitivist (who thinks of GRWm and GRWf in terms of
fundamental ontology) just as much as for the reductionist (who views GRWm
and GRWf as alternative ways to derive local beables from GRW0). Therefore,
one might say, insofar as underdetermination does not prevent us from real-
ism about fundamental ontology, it should not prevent us from realism about
derivative ontology either.
There is something unsatisfactory about this line of argument, however.
While it is true that both the primitivist and the reductionist have to react to
the problem of underdetermination by invoking ontological choices, the prim-
itivist account now looks more natural, because its choice concerns only the
fundamental level. Once this is settled, everything else follows. By contrast,
the reductionist first needs to specify her fundamental ontology (the quantum
state) and then, in the course of deriving local beables from that basis, needs
to invoke a second choice, investing one particular set of local beables with
ontological significance.
This second choice may raise a number of critical questions. First, one
might ask how there can be a choice at all, if we assume that there are principles
which, once the fundamental ontology is fixed, uniquely determine the derivative
ontology as well.10 My reply is that there is a choice in the same sense as in
the case of the primitivist’s choice between GRWm and GRWf. In both cases,
there are two mutually incompatible (but empirically equivalent) ways the world
could be. The difference between the two cases is that in one case, the two ways
differ on the level of fundamental ontology, while in the other case, they differ
in the principles according to which the fundamental ontology gives rise to local
beables. The reductionist may be ignorant of these principles, but in the same
way, the primitivist is ignorant of the fundamental ontology, so they both need
to make an educated guess about whether we live in a GRWm world or in
a GRWf world. Furthermore, the reductionist’s guess is regulated by the very
same principles of metaphysical theory choice as the primitivist’s. Let me briefly
discuss the two principles that matter most in the present context.
On the one hand, a principle of parsimony speaks in favor of GRWf. As we
have seen above, locating matter at the points in F suffices to account for the
empirical content of the GRW theory. The most parsimonious hypothesis about
the set M \ F is then simply that it does not contain any matter at all. The
resulting picture is precisely the one of GRWf.
On the other hand, there is a well-entrenched metaphysical principle for-
bidding action at a distance. This clashes with the GRWf ontology, as can be
seen by considering the simplest possible particle physics experiment: a source
positions agree that there is one correct ontology, otherwise there would be nothing for the
agnostic to be agnostic about.
10I owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee, who calls these principles “principles of
emergence”. I avoid this terminology, because emergence is sometimes understood as being
incompatible with reduction.
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emits a particle, which is subsequently recorded by a detector. According to
GRWf, both the source and the detector consist of a multitude of flashes, but
there is nothing that travels from one to the other, hence nothing to mediate
the interaction between them (see Esfeld and Gisin (2014, section 5); Esfeld
(2014a) makes the same argument, but erroneously takes it to threaten the em-
pirical adequacy of GRWf, rather than just its conformity to a metaphysical
principle). This principle thus favors GRWm, in which a matter field mediates
the interaction between the source and the detector.
Obviously, invoking such metaphysical principles does not straightforwardly
resolve the underdetermination, because metaphysical principles may pull in
opposite directions (as is the case here). Furthermore, people disagree about
the soundness of metaphysical principles and about the relative weight these
principles should be given. But again, this problem confronts the primitivist
and the reductionist alike.
As noted above, an advantage for the primitivist seems to consist in the fact
that he can confine his ontological choice to the fundamental level, while the
reductionist’s choice between GRWm and GRWf takes place on the derivative
level, in addition to her specification of the fundamental ontology. However, it
is not the case that the primitivist can do without any ontological choices on the
derivative level. For example, even if one opts for a primitive ontology of parti-
cles, this does not settle the further question as to which collections of particles
constitute real objects and which ones do not. Just as in the case of GRWf and
GRWm, considerations of parsimony may motivate antirealism about composite
objects, whereas explanatory considerations speak in favor of recognizing some
of them as real. This means that, even taking into account the underdetermi-
nation between GRWf and GRWm, the reductionist’s methodology is no less
respectable than the primitivist’s: after having specified their respective funda-
mental ontologies, they both need to make additional ontological choices on the
derivative level, based on the ontological principles they value.
As a final objection, one might question the analogy between the GRWm/GRWf
choice and the kind of ontological disputes mentioned in the previous paragraph.
The temptation to regard a dispute as unsubstantial (and accordingly to believe
that one can do without choosing) seems stronger when one is asked whether
some collection of particles “really” constitute an object than when one considers
the matter content of M \ F . However, I do not see any robust justification for
this difference of attitude. First, let us not be fooled by Maudlin’s above-quoted
counterfactual story about “seeing local beables in all details” into believing that
the difference between GRWm and GRWf is somehow “observable in principle”.
Given the way the GRW dynamics works, this difference is just as much a piece
of unobservable metaphysics as the difference between a real cat and some cat-
wise arranged particles. More importantly, suppose one tries to dissolve the
dispute between realism and antirealism about cats by suggesting that the dis-
agreement about the reality of cats is really just a pragmatic issue, whereas
ultimately both parties agree that there are particles which sometimes arrange
themselves cat-wise. This appeal to the fundamental level invites a similar story
to be told in the GRW case, understood as a disagreement about derivative on-
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tology: here as well, both parties ultimately agree about what there is, namely
the quantum state. At that level, everything that constitutes their disagreement
(not only the matter content of M \F , but the space-time M itself) disappears.
In sum, the underdetermination between GRWm and GRWf is really on a par
with other cases of underdetermined derivative ontology and therefore need not
worry the reductionist.
5. Conclusion
The attempt to reduce local beables to the quantum state faces the challenge
of demonstrating the physical salience of the reduction relation between the
quantum state and the local beables. I have looked at two ways in which the
reductionist literature has responded to that challenge and found them both to
be incomplete as they stand. I have then performed the necessary argumentative
work to render these responses successful. As a result, the threat to the physical
salience of derived local beables is now completely neutralized.
Of course, this only establishes that reductionism about local beables is vi-
able (insofar as one accepts my promissory note in footnote 5 above), not that it
is preferable to primitivism. Considerations of parsimony in fundamental ontol-
ogy may motivate a preference for reductionism over a position that postulates
primitive local beables alongside the quantum state, but this cannot be the
whole story. First, ontological parsimony is not all that matters, and second,
some recent versions of primitivism score quite well on parsimony by taking the
opposite direction of the road discussed in this paper: instead of reducing local
beables to the quantum state, they attempt to reduce the quantum state to the
local beables (Esfeld, 2014b; Callender, 2015). Evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of reductionism (as defended in the present paper) compared to
these other proposals is a project for another day.
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